Nice bit of militant atheism, audio links at the bottom.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins
Sunday, 10 December 2006
A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu
Many thanks to JL for providing a very interesting article and topic fo reflection.
It seems to me that, in the popular sphere at least, Britain and America approach their history in different ways. The emotions evoked by consideration of the Past are by no means similar; for America the past is a source of celebration or, on occasion, grave disconcertion. For the British, and especially, the English the Past is either a weary burden or some rose-tinted nostalgia. The Second World War, for instance, seems to embody some lost spirit of community, the 'Blitz spirit', as it were, as much as the fighting itself. The English seem to have an unease, a healthy unease, of Jingoism, as shown by the complete indifference shown to St. George's Day. This is reinforced in schools where we are taught, quite rightly in my view, of the bitter anguish and desolation, as expressed by Owen, Sassoon et al., caused by devotion to some woolly notion of nation.
On occasion the hypnotic flames of Jingoism are rekindled - the Falkland Islands spring to mind here - but on the whole it is a reluctance to participate that seems to define Britain as a nation - hence our strong tradition of satire from Hogarth to Baron Cohen. Yet, despite this collective jadedness, recent years have seen a number of interventions, such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone and recently Afghanisatan and Iraq. These operations have some moral purchase, for a foreign policy based solely on pragmatic realism seems just as abhorrent as unrestrained idealism. I would not want Britain to trade and accept some despot or dictator as he commits unknown atrocities or to sit idly by as some country starts wholesale slaughter, as happened in Rwanda.
In the case of Iraq I do not believe in a Rousseaian notion of a 'people' needing to be represented, helped or indeed ruled. But I do believe the amplified effects of religious minorities have caused an unjustifiable loss of life. Nor do these minorities work in complete isolation, Iran and Syria not withstanding, I am mindful of Ian Kershaw's writings on Nazi Germany, on how widespread support and asistance needs to be, on how it was neighbourly denunciations as much as men in leather coats that sustained the Gestapo. The problems of Iraq are deeply ingrained, which it why it was foolish to think it could be acheived with a cheap and easy victory as envisioned by Donald Rumsfeld.
Perhaps it is indicative of a flaw in the American political structure in that it lurches in and out of policy choices with leaps and starts. The vacuum of power seems to require more troops, not less, and of all nations in order to provide legitimacy and prevent the characterisation of militias as anti-Imperial freedom fighters. Blair was right in this respect, for a UN resolution would have greatly assisted in this predicament. The balance was not struck between the energy and resources of America and the legitimacy of a wider global community. As it stands the Coalition seems as multilateral as the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, where a couple of Polish lifeguards were tacked on to an overwhelming mass of Russian tank divisions. To effect worthwhile change requires either luck, or, more frequently, long-term investment in terms of resources, attention and willpower. The beneficial effects of democracy, I read somewhere, do not come as an enlightening flood, but as a slow, accumulated trickle.
It seems to me that, in the popular sphere at least, Britain and America approach their history in different ways. The emotions evoked by consideration of the Past are by no means similar; for America the past is a source of celebration or, on occasion, grave disconcertion. For the British, and especially, the English the Past is either a weary burden or some rose-tinted nostalgia. The Second World War, for instance, seems to embody some lost spirit of community, the 'Blitz spirit', as it were, as much as the fighting itself. The English seem to have an unease, a healthy unease, of Jingoism, as shown by the complete indifference shown to St. George's Day. This is reinforced in schools where we are taught, quite rightly in my view, of the bitter anguish and desolation, as expressed by Owen, Sassoon et al., caused by devotion to some woolly notion of nation.
On occasion the hypnotic flames of Jingoism are rekindled - the Falkland Islands spring to mind here - but on the whole it is a reluctance to participate that seems to define Britain as a nation - hence our strong tradition of satire from Hogarth to Baron Cohen. Yet, despite this collective jadedness, recent years have seen a number of interventions, such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone and recently Afghanisatan and Iraq. These operations have some moral purchase, for a foreign policy based solely on pragmatic realism seems just as abhorrent as unrestrained idealism. I would not want Britain to trade and accept some despot or dictator as he commits unknown atrocities or to sit idly by as some country starts wholesale slaughter, as happened in Rwanda.
In the case of Iraq I do not believe in a Rousseaian notion of a 'people' needing to be represented, helped or indeed ruled. But I do believe the amplified effects of religious minorities have caused an unjustifiable loss of life. Nor do these minorities work in complete isolation, Iran and Syria not withstanding, I am mindful of Ian Kershaw's writings on Nazi Germany, on how widespread support and asistance needs to be, on how it was neighbourly denunciations as much as men in leather coats that sustained the Gestapo. The problems of Iraq are deeply ingrained, which it why it was foolish to think it could be acheived with a cheap and easy victory as envisioned by Donald Rumsfeld.
Perhaps it is indicative of a flaw in the American political structure in that it lurches in and out of policy choices with leaps and starts. The vacuum of power seems to require more troops, not less, and of all nations in order to provide legitimacy and prevent the characterisation of militias as anti-Imperial freedom fighters. Blair was right in this respect, for a UN resolution would have greatly assisted in this predicament. The balance was not struck between the energy and resources of America and the legitimacy of a wider global community. As it stands the Coalition seems as multilateral as the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, where a couple of Polish lifeguards were tacked on to an overwhelming mass of Russian tank divisions. To effect worthwhile change requires either luck, or, more frequently, long-term investment in terms of resources, attention and willpower. The beneficial effects of democracy, I read somewhere, do not come as an enlightening flood, but as a slow, accumulated trickle.
Saturday, 2 December 2006
Ikiru
'Living' is its meaning, before you ask, and it is the name of an utterly powerful film by Kurosawa. This film produces such a torrent of superlatives that the mere presence of any other descriptive grammatical form seems an infringement on all norms of decency that are purported to exist in Western civilisation. Kurosawa's best, certainly, perhaps even of all Japanese cinema, the most convincing pondering on the human condition, Shimura's finest work etc. etc.
A faceless bureaucrat faces the ultimate existential quandry as he becomes acutely aware of his own transience. A terminal illness wakes him from his white collar somnabulance and he desperately seeks to find meaning from his empty, wasted life. The product: Ultimately, as the memory of his death fades, only indifference. Yet, there is triumph as he succeeds in building a children's playground, despite a host of obstacles from co-workers, family, even the mafia. It has, arguably, an uncomfortable pessimism but is truly a great work of art. The climax of the film is the bureaucrat Watanabe's uncontrollable contentment as he swings in his playground. The end has resolution, unlike, say, the rather mediocre Broken Flowers, but it much more convincing that some saccharine conclusion of a Capra. Bergmar produced similar works but Ikiru has that subtle humour that just tips the balance in Kurosawa's favour. To my mind many paralells can be drawn with Fellini, which is indeed a good thing.
Upon consideration one would find this general period very fecund for a certain style, a weariness and distrust for the conventions that sat uneasily upon the populaces of the world as they were coming to terms with the scale and impact of the Second World War. There is a miasmic aura of disillusionment and Satre and Camus seem to be on the unacknowledged periphery of all significant artworks. In America think of On the Waterfront and The Pornbroker, the latter an utterly underrated film, the former more acclaimed but both deserving of the highest accolades. In the UK from the troubled mind of Hancock was The Rebel. Of course I could and perhaps should list more, but, suffice it to say that when the glitz and glamour become jejune in the public's eyes, when big budget producers run out of special effects, it is to these types of films, to this genre that they will instinctively look.
Or not, but they're good films.
A faceless bureaucrat faces the ultimate existential quandry as he becomes acutely aware of his own transience. A terminal illness wakes him from his white collar somnabulance and he desperately seeks to find meaning from his empty, wasted life. The product: Ultimately, as the memory of his death fades, only indifference. Yet, there is triumph as he succeeds in building a children's playground, despite a host of obstacles from co-workers, family, even the mafia. It has, arguably, an uncomfortable pessimism but is truly a great work of art. The climax of the film is the bureaucrat Watanabe's uncontrollable contentment as he swings in his playground. The end has resolution, unlike, say, the rather mediocre Broken Flowers, but it much more convincing that some saccharine conclusion of a Capra. Bergmar produced similar works but Ikiru has that subtle humour that just tips the balance in Kurosawa's favour. To my mind many paralells can be drawn with Fellini, which is indeed a good thing.
Upon consideration one would find this general period very fecund for a certain style, a weariness and distrust for the conventions that sat uneasily upon the populaces of the world as they were coming to terms with the scale and impact of the Second World War. There is a miasmic aura of disillusionment and Satre and Camus seem to be on the unacknowledged periphery of all significant artworks. In America think of On the Waterfront and The Pornbroker, the latter an utterly underrated film, the former more acclaimed but both deserving of the highest accolades. In the UK from the troubled mind of Hancock was The Rebel. Of course I could and perhaps should list more, but, suffice it to say that when the glitz and glamour become jejune in the public's eyes, when big budget producers run out of special effects, it is to these types of films, to this genre that they will instinctively look.
Or not, but they're good films.
Friday, 1 December 2006
Some corner of a foreign blog that is forever England: Britishness in the 21st century and why the experts are wrong.
The definition of 'Britishness' seems a very en vogue topic at present. Of course, I would trace its current manifestation to the easy, short-term political capital generated from the (seemingly exagerated) 'threat' of immigration. The difference at the moment is the Left's (well, Labour's) preoccupation with the topic. Labouristas have flirted with the rhetoric of xenophobia in their jockeying for position as Tony Blair begins to wind down his time at number ten. It is certainly an age-old and reliable technique that generates support from the right-leaning sections of the party and headlines in the Mail. Gordon Brown has his speeches on national identity and the style Jack Straw's comments on Islamic headwear seem an almost faint mimicry of Kilroy-Silk, and common sense dictates that any similarity with that man is something to be avoided if at all possible. It is a crude way of doing politics and no doubt will be discarded rapidly for its effects are only short-term.
However, the underlying question remains: What does it mean to be British? Some, such as Lord Tebbitt, believed it can be reduced to a 'cricket match' test: Who would you support in cricket match? Others, such as the Guardian believe it is a set of values, particularly individuality, liberty, inclusiveness and other such terms that sound good but generally become very vague and nebulous upon examination. I mean, it is nice to think of England as the home of noble virtues but we did have the Empire for a good long while, a great cause of oppression, chauvanistic nationalism and general snobbery. Such a definition is woolly and untenable under any intensive scrutiny. So let us take the politicians out of the picture and see what some historians have to say.
If one is to believe the post-structuralists, meaning is derived by a term's opposition to something else, thus, in the past, Britishness was formed by opposition to other countries, particularly the Empire; the stoic rationality of the British was shown by the effeminate barbarism of subject nations. Yet, previous objects of comparison, such as the greasy Frenchman or the lazy Irishman, no longer seem valid. [Note to self -finish this section later]
So what is the answer? Well, the solution is firstly to separate the nation from the state, for it is when the two are combined that problems arise. When nationality can be minutely defined by, say, ethnic critieria, then this legitimises processes of exclusion - tighter border controls, id cards etc. Conversely, vague, rose-tinted values are easily manipulated or used to justify any sort of policy - 'liberty' when spoken by a politician usually means free trade and/or helping out businesses, 'self-sacrifice' and 'civic values' means we'll be probably fighting in some war soon etc.
Far better to recognise nationality in the political sphere as just being a beaureaucratic boundary, lines on a map for administrative purposes, somewhat arbitrary but useful for sharing resources to citizens. Of course, this leads to organisations of a supra-national nature, but I shall return to the theme of cosmopolitanism at a later date.
And a definition of Britishness? Not questioning what Britishness is, not seeking to know its exact causes and forms, that is to be British. To assume the quality of Britishness just emerges from whenever by virtue of itself and accept that as a valid definition in others. If you have to question it, pin it down and study it then it disappears. I believe that is what it means to be British. Without wishing to sound too much like a slacker hippy: 'let it be'.
Hmm quoting Lennon seems to invalidate my argument somehow, I shall reexamine tomorrow.
However, the underlying question remains: What does it mean to be British? Some, such as Lord Tebbitt, believed it can be reduced to a 'cricket match' test: Who would you support in cricket match? Others, such as the Guardian believe it is a set of values, particularly individuality, liberty, inclusiveness and other such terms that sound good but generally become very vague and nebulous upon examination. I mean, it is nice to think of England as the home of noble virtues but we did have the Empire for a good long while, a great cause of oppression, chauvanistic nationalism and general snobbery. Such a definition is woolly and untenable under any intensive scrutiny. So let us take the politicians out of the picture and see what some historians have to say.
If one is to believe the post-structuralists, meaning is derived by a term's opposition to something else, thus, in the past, Britishness was formed by opposition to other countries, particularly the Empire; the stoic rationality of the British was shown by the effeminate barbarism of subject nations. Yet, previous objects of comparison, such as the greasy Frenchman or the lazy Irishman, no longer seem valid. [Note to self -finish this section later]
So what is the answer? Well, the solution is firstly to separate the nation from the state, for it is when the two are combined that problems arise. When nationality can be minutely defined by, say, ethnic critieria, then this legitimises processes of exclusion - tighter border controls, id cards etc. Conversely, vague, rose-tinted values are easily manipulated or used to justify any sort of policy - 'liberty' when spoken by a politician usually means free trade and/or helping out businesses, 'self-sacrifice' and 'civic values' means we'll be probably fighting in some war soon etc.
Far better to recognise nationality in the political sphere as just being a beaureaucratic boundary, lines on a map for administrative purposes, somewhat arbitrary but useful for sharing resources to citizens. Of course, this leads to organisations of a supra-national nature, but I shall return to the theme of cosmopolitanism at a later date.
And a definition of Britishness? Not questioning what Britishness is, not seeking to know its exact causes and forms, that is to be British. To assume the quality of Britishness just emerges from whenever by virtue of itself and accept that as a valid definition in others. If you have to question it, pin it down and study it then it disappears. I believe that is what it means to be British. Without wishing to sound too much like a slacker hippy: 'let it be'.
Hmm quoting Lennon seems to invalidate my argument somehow, I shall reexamine tomorrow.
Thursday, 30 November 2006
Saturday, 25 November 2006
From Peer to Shining Peer: American Hegemony and the Internet
The internet is a relatively new medium of cultural expression. It is so ubiquitous, its progress so rapid that our collecitive memory almost forgets that within 10-20 years it has colonized Western households in an unprecedented fashion. Yet, for all its apparent novelty insights into this phenomenon can be derived from historical precedent. Appreciation of the significance of the internet has not yet been fully developed, no doubt because the upper echelons of academia have not had the same level of exposure to and interaction with the internet - old people cannot approach new technology without a profound sense of unease (at least it seems from my experience). Thus, the scrutiny that has been applied to print and broadcast media has not yet been applied and certain assumptions remain unchallenged particularly concerning levels of transparency and democracy on the web.
A naive mentality, present at the early stages of the press, radio and possibly television, proclaims the supposedly 'organic' nature of the internet. Not only can everyone (who wants to) express themselves but also information can accumulate and be dispersed as if free from partiality and interference. A prominent American journalist claimed, for instance, how
"The Information Revolution is likely to democratize politics by weakening the elites’ grip on information."
A cursory glance dispels such mythology.
Firstly, use of internet requires participation in a consumerist culture that is somewhat plutocratic in nature. A prerequisite of the internet is the purchase of a computer as well as paying for connection, the former of which is self-perpetuating given the rapid obsolescence of technology. In addition, one might argue that to make a site that is of decent quality requires training - more so in years to come as complexity increases - which is not as readily available in the developing world. Whilst the opportunity for anyone to create a website is there, the majority are, of course, of Western origin, especially American, which necessarily reflect American agenda, topics and views.
Another feature of interest is the proliferation of 'astroturfing'. Astroturfing is the appearance of sites, videos or opinions purporting to be genuine expressions of 'grass roots' discontent but are produced by political or corporate organizations (hence astroturfing). Thus, media-savvy elites give their messages a facade of popular authenticity. One example is a flash video parody of Al Gore's An Inconvenient Truth. Whilst seeming to be made by some random citizen of the internet it was in face the creation of a PR agency funded by ExxonMobil. Of course, this sort of activity has been a common feature in other media (e.g. letters written to editors by 'members of the public') but a common sense skepticism of such features is arguably not present in the internet generation. Consider the 'China Bounder', a blog supposedly of an Englishman living in Bejing, who intertwined criticism of the Chinese govnerment with tales of his sexual conquests of 'easy' Chinese women. The vigilante group formed to track him down was disappointed to find out he was the creation of a few politically minded Japanese students.
Despite assumptions to the contrary some sense of governmental boundaries is still present. One might consider the censorship in China, not just in Google but also the hundreds of security staff who monitor the internet for signs of dissention. One might consider the US government's pressure to censor the .xxx domain name, setting a precedent for intervention in the running of the internet. One might also consider the US's continued control of Icann, the technology that runs the internet, despite EU, Chinese and Russian requests for an inter-governmental body at the WSIS summit. However, the recent actions by the Swedish government to close the Bit Torrent-based website 'PirateBay.org' that is perhaps the most unpalatable development.
Under Swedish law the use of Bit Torrents for file sharing is not illegal. Yet, Hollywood's main political lobbying body, the IMAA, was able to exert influence in the White House, who put immense pressure on the Swedish government to act on the copyright infringement with the threat of sanctions. The Swedish Justice Department then ordered the police (which is illegal under the Swedish Constitution) to take action, which in turn resulted in a raid on the Pirate Bay base of operations and the seizure of computers and databases. The backlash to this has led to the creation of a 'Pirate Party', which seeks to question the nature of international copyright and patent law.
This seems to be happening of its own accord anyway, with music sharing as hard to police as booze during the Prohibition Period. Certainly one website (SpiralFrog) is already preparing to give away all music in exchange for the screening of adverts. It is possible that in the future copyright legislation may change and make a virtue of a necessity. However, a darker possibility exists; America may use its economic might to bully and cajole those who do not adhere to their own conception of jurisprudence. Probably most would side against Pirate Bay if push comes to shove and they survive by means of legal anomaly, yet, this sets a precedent that may surface in another form. It is not completely inconceivable that some site that provokes the ire of America may provide an excuse for unilateral involvement, perhaps in some sort of crackdown on terrorist websites or breech of national security.
Well, it's a possibility, and I write it to illustrate my central point that the internet is not some disinterested intrument of progress and harmony but just as susceptible to manipulation as the more established media. In the past the Press helped cause wars, such as the Spanish-American War, radio and film were sued by totalitarian regimes to great effect (esp. Germany) and television helped stop a war (Vietnam), so I hope with adequate thought and analysis the internet will be used for the good of humanity, or at least not misused too much.
Note to self- polish off that last paragraph when not tired.
A naive mentality, present at the early stages of the press, radio and possibly television, proclaims the supposedly 'organic' nature of the internet. Not only can everyone (who wants to) express themselves but also information can accumulate and be dispersed as if free from partiality and interference. A prominent American journalist claimed, for instance, how
"The Information Revolution is likely to democratize politics by weakening the elites’ grip on information."
A cursory glance dispels such mythology.
Firstly, use of internet requires participation in a consumerist culture that is somewhat plutocratic in nature. A prerequisite of the internet is the purchase of a computer as well as paying for connection, the former of which is self-perpetuating given the rapid obsolescence of technology. In addition, one might argue that to make a site that is of decent quality requires training - more so in years to come as complexity increases - which is not as readily available in the developing world. Whilst the opportunity for anyone to create a website is there, the majority are, of course, of Western origin, especially American, which necessarily reflect American agenda, topics and views.
Another feature of interest is the proliferation of 'astroturfing'. Astroturfing is the appearance of sites, videos or opinions purporting to be genuine expressions of 'grass roots' discontent but are produced by political or corporate organizations (hence astroturfing). Thus, media-savvy elites give their messages a facade of popular authenticity. One example is a flash video parody of Al Gore's An Inconvenient Truth. Whilst seeming to be made by some random citizen of the internet it was in face the creation of a PR agency funded by ExxonMobil. Of course, this sort of activity has been a common feature in other media (e.g. letters written to editors by 'members of the public') but a common sense skepticism of such features is arguably not present in the internet generation. Consider the 'China Bounder', a blog supposedly of an Englishman living in Bejing, who intertwined criticism of the Chinese govnerment with tales of his sexual conquests of 'easy' Chinese women. The vigilante group formed to track him down was disappointed to find out he was the creation of a few politically minded Japanese students.
Despite assumptions to the contrary some sense of governmental boundaries is still present. One might consider the censorship in China, not just in Google but also the hundreds of security staff who monitor the internet for signs of dissention. One might consider the US government's pressure to censor the .xxx domain name, setting a precedent for intervention in the running of the internet. One might also consider the US's continued control of Icann, the technology that runs the internet, despite EU, Chinese and Russian requests for an inter-governmental body at the WSIS summit. However, the recent actions by the Swedish government to close the Bit Torrent-based website 'PirateBay.org' that is perhaps the most unpalatable development.
Under Swedish law the use of Bit Torrents for file sharing is not illegal. Yet, Hollywood's main political lobbying body, the IMAA, was able to exert influence in the White House, who put immense pressure on the Swedish government to act on the copyright infringement with the threat of sanctions. The Swedish Justice Department then ordered the police (which is illegal under the Swedish Constitution) to take action, which in turn resulted in a raid on the Pirate Bay base of operations and the seizure of computers and databases. The backlash to this has led to the creation of a 'Pirate Party', which seeks to question the nature of international copyright and patent law.
This seems to be happening of its own accord anyway, with music sharing as hard to police as booze during the Prohibition Period. Certainly one website (SpiralFrog) is already preparing to give away all music in exchange for the screening of adverts. It is possible that in the future copyright legislation may change and make a virtue of a necessity. However, a darker possibility exists; America may use its economic might to bully and cajole those who do not adhere to their own conception of jurisprudence. Probably most would side against Pirate Bay if push comes to shove and they survive by means of legal anomaly, yet, this sets a precedent that may surface in another form. It is not completely inconceivable that some site that provokes the ire of America may provide an excuse for unilateral involvement, perhaps in some sort of crackdown on terrorist websites or breech of national security.
Well, it's a possibility, and I write it to illustrate my central point that the internet is not some disinterested intrument of progress and harmony but just as susceptible to manipulation as the more established media. In the past the Press helped cause wars, such as the Spanish-American War, radio and film were sued by totalitarian regimes to great effect (esp. Germany) and television helped stop a war (Vietnam), so I hope with adequate thought and analysis the internet will be used for the good of humanity, or at least not misused too much.
Note to self- polish off that last paragraph when not tired.
Thursday, 23 November 2006
Guerilla History: Viva la Revolution?
Inherited convention often provides the historian with the basic guide for forming his words. Structure, content, methodology; all of these seek provide the Cliophile with the language and form by which he may enter into conversation with the historical community and thus adscribe value to his work. However, adhering to such practices necessarily place the historian at a disadvantage vis-a-vis those who appraise his work. It is thus an act of submission at the very point of initiation that maintains and articulates a relationship of power. It colours the work before a word is spoken. Such a relationship should be renegotiated to the advantage of the historian in order that the work acts not to strengthen the historiographical status quo.
One may assume that actors that play their part in the grand theatre of history were subject to the self-same emotional contortions that you or I experience. Yet, these emotional responses are always neutralised in their translation into historical account. Explanation in history assumes on some level the rationality of leaders to the exclusion of the fundamental causes of human action: the irrational elements. This is not to undermine the intelligence or mental consistency, merely to question the boundaries of rational thought. Yet, these irrational elements are not represented, at least not to any noticeable degree: "Leader x was sad" hardly conveys the vividness and immediacy of his response. How can this be remedied?
A grand event, let's say a conference, can be represented scene by scene, action by action, dialogue written in full adn verbatim, if sources permit. Motivations of actors elaborated upon, as well as minor details, clothing, decor, room layout; all done with a historian's keen eye and skill with sources. Historical agency is not weighted to one event, to a few grand figures in some Carlisylian sense. Instead, long-term influences are articulated in conjunction with immediate ones; for those who exercise power are deemed to be subject to aspects of their environment, their cultural baggage, their personal and collective psychology, the nature of thier social interaction.
Thus will be created, as I have to cut short my writings due to temporal exigency, a micro-historical model that seems almost like a mirror image of Braudel. Whilst he attempted to view history from afar, this history will investigate the mysteries of the universe of the immediate sphere of action. A seemingly revolutionary act.
One may assume that actors that play their part in the grand theatre of history were subject to the self-same emotional contortions that you or I experience. Yet, these emotional responses are always neutralised in their translation into historical account. Explanation in history assumes on some level the rationality of leaders to the exclusion of the fundamental causes of human action: the irrational elements. This is not to undermine the intelligence or mental consistency, merely to question the boundaries of rational thought. Yet, these irrational elements are not represented, at least not to any noticeable degree: "Leader x was sad" hardly conveys the vividness and immediacy of his response. How can this be remedied?
A grand event, let's say a conference, can be represented scene by scene, action by action, dialogue written in full adn verbatim, if sources permit. Motivations of actors elaborated upon, as well as minor details, clothing, decor, room layout; all done with a historian's keen eye and skill with sources. Historical agency is not weighted to one event, to a few grand figures in some Carlisylian sense. Instead, long-term influences are articulated in conjunction with immediate ones; for those who exercise power are deemed to be subject to aspects of their environment, their cultural baggage, their personal and collective psychology, the nature of thier social interaction.
Thus will be created, as I have to cut short my writings due to temporal exigency, a micro-historical model that seems almost like a mirror image of Braudel. Whilst he attempted to view history from afar, this history will investigate the mysteries of the universe of the immediate sphere of action. A seemingly revolutionary act.
Thursday, 16 November 2006
The Study of History is Depraved and Decadent - Preface to a Gonzo History
“To future ages may thy dullness last,
As thou preserv’st the dulness of the past”
Men once fought and died for the noble ideals that they discerned from History. To do so was, of course, morally very questionable. In fact those that did so were fools. However, one must admire their spirit. Indeed it is the absence of that spirit that has made History the sham it is today. It is barren, lifeless and in the emaciated hands of foul practitioners, who condense and distil its colourful flavours into a drab, boring grey. We, enlightened readers, must liberate History from the clutches of the Oxbridge necrophiliacs who salivate over antiquated dust-covers in the safe seclusion of the library. It is no longer enjoyable, only commercial, no longer truthful but sedatory. Where are the lively discussions in coffee houses? Where is experimentation? Where is innovation? They are gone, hidden by layers of mediocrity and stultified senility.
Our history is our identity, so what does that make us, the society that produces such insipidity as is seen in today’s works? A confused, bumbling, pretentious mess with a shiny cover, with the obscurity of the esoteric and the shallowness of the populist?
What must be done?
We must unclasp the manacles of mediocrity. Rise up – Sing, shout, dance to Clio’s beautiful tune, for alongside her sister muses sits Clio, equal to them in status and now with an open mouth!
This journal’s goal is, like a Don Quixote of the archives, to seek out new adventures in the foreign land of the past; we will confront the uninteresting and unimaginative wherever we find them and lay siege on their repugnant form. Whether it is by treading the untrodden path or approaching the familiar with new eyes we will progress, bold in our resolve and unflinching in our steps, towards that most worthy of ends: The Historical Truth.
On the Necessity of Error - Blueprint for a Gonzo History
Praise be for the bumbling inventors, those ramshackle pioneers, those noble experimenters who are responsible for so much. They have contributed to humanity, and not just through their toils and successes, but through their mistakes, their deviations from convention, their erroneous judgements. In error lies progress, for errors produce innovation. It is the flawed mimicry of greatness that sometimes produces greatness, the unsuccessful attempt to appropriate some vision, dream or precedent that results in a new perspective or methodology. Some regard their existing state of affairs as wrong and thus attempt to change it. Others try to perpetuate that state of affairs and are betrayed in doing so by their endeavours to translate some aspect through themselves, wishing to hold true to the original yet losing or changing something in that translation. In Art it is the inability to capture the visual essence of something or the failed adoption of some previous style that produces beauty, in literature a defiance of the rules of clear communication makes language colourful and exciting. Yet, to admit such a process seems anathema to the very basis of knowledge. Orthodoxy states that the inductive process learns from mistakes and thus corrects itself; inversion of this statement is far better – the inductive process should only be valued in its capacity to produce mistakes.
Modernity, and perhaps thinkers before that period, wishes to see the world as it really is, the truthful nature of the universe, universal and correct, free from the limits of perspective that a mere individual human has. I would wonder, though, whether they would really want this, for to see the world as it really is would make it seem cold and lifeless, bleak and futile. We would be mere collections of atoms chemically linked for a while before being dispersed into the cosmos. Rationality would defeat itself, for there would be no need to do much at all, given the obvious finalities of our existence. Thus, the irrational must be present in even the most scientific of investigations to some degree. It is its lifeblood and progenitor. This irrationality is not truthful, it is an erroneous perception of the world but it is vitally, vitally important. Of course, if we indulge in this irrationality we perhaps become as animals and would lose the many benefits of modernity, which have improved the material condition of lives. How, then, should these two aspects of the human condition interact? How is a balance to be obtained? For the most part, people find their own balance and this is probably the best way, though, those who can often try to manipulate the balance and direct it – irrationality is indeed potentially dangerous.
The point should be not to change society on some grand scale, merely a greater acceptance of a playful irresponsibility whenever possible. This is the reasoning behind the Gonzo History Journal and thus it would wholly improper to castigate, demean or condescend the defining ethos of this most academic of academic journals.
Modernity, and perhaps thinkers before that period, wishes to see the world as it really is, the truthful nature of the universe, universal and correct, free from the limits of perspective that a mere individual human has. I would wonder, though, whether they would really want this, for to see the world as it really is would make it seem cold and lifeless, bleak and futile. We would be mere collections of atoms chemically linked for a while before being dispersed into the cosmos. Rationality would defeat itself, for there would be no need to do much at all, given the obvious finalities of our existence. Thus, the irrational must be present in even the most scientific of investigations to some degree. It is its lifeblood and progenitor. This irrationality is not truthful, it is an erroneous perception of the world but it is vitally, vitally important. Of course, if we indulge in this irrationality we perhaps become as animals and would lose the many benefits of modernity, which have improved the material condition of lives. How, then, should these two aspects of the human condition interact? How is a balance to be obtained? For the most part, people find their own balance and this is probably the best way, though, those who can often try to manipulate the balance and direct it – irrationality is indeed potentially dangerous.
The point should be not to change society on some grand scale, merely a greater acceptance of a playful irresponsibility whenever possible. This is the reasoning behind the Gonzo History Journal and thus it would wholly improper to castigate, demean or condescend the defining ethos of this most academic of academic journals.
Tuesday, 14 November 2006
On the Aesthetic and Ideological Function of Lampposts
I see it as a vital function, perhaps duty, of every person who would consider himself (or herself) to be free to question the values that compose their view on life. Not only the foreground matters, though important, the dramas, tribulations and flashing images that preoccupy our thoughts for the most part, but also those that create the backdrop; the hidden discourses, the defining features that it is so easy to leave unquestioned. These form the mise-en-scene of our lives, shape it unquantifiably, indicate so many things about ourselves as individuals and as a society but encounter the anaesthesia of a supposed banality and do not receive our focus.
What one age considers a truism the next age dismisses as ridiculous absurdity. Reality is not as monolithic as is assumed. The possibility for great instability is there; this should not necessarily be employed, but at least acknowledged and pondered, if only occasionally. So it is with this in mind that I approach the topic at hand. Lampposts are ubiquitous; we pass a great number in the course of a single day without ever noting what they represent. They are so ingrained into our being that the possibility of their absence seems anathema, yet they are historically incidental. They are the ornaments of modernity, its symbol, and, as such, are indelibly woven into the construction of our values: They are ideological.
The Sun, and perhaps light in general, has a religious significance that lies, sometimes overtly, sometimes subconsciously, in the Western psyche. Pantheism and animalism gave pride of place to the Sun god, provider of life. Through the Egyptians and Greeks the religious world converged on monotheism, culminating in Christianity in whose the language of revelation and divinity is synonymous with light: Did not Moses demonstrate the Jewish god’s power by blacking out the Sun? Are we not supposed to ‘see the light?’ So the Enlightenment project in overthrowing the ‘superstitions’ of its backward forbears assumed this language. The power over light is power over Nature itself – a mighty goal for humanism. Lampposts are not just about illumination - they are about demonstration.
On every street in every town the power of scientific, rational thought is made evident to the populace. Man proves himself dominant over the revolutions of the Earth. Lampposts represent order and structure and serve society well. A government study (link listed below) has noted that it is not the amount of light that diminishes crime, nor are they of great assistance in increasing visibility, if anything they are blight, causing light pollution. Instead, the effects are placebonic in nature. Crime is reduced indirectly because the spirit of community is fostered, the perception of safety is increased. The rational justifications for their presence are not borne by the facts – they don’t directly reduced crime and one can question the utility of a little extra light. They provide comfort because they show that some higher power (the state) has control here and is looking after this area, giving it attention and this induces informal social control. Criminals are deterred not from fear of detection or improved surveillance but subconscious associations with the instruments of power. Lighted areas illustrate a more controlled use of public space, this is how they effect crime.
They are made by Man and yet seem somewhat natural. A street, particularly a high street, seems odd without this lighting. Since this is part of our identity should we praise their security and comfort or criticise the control they exercise, to pass judgement on this is to pass judgement on ourselves: Should we seek freedom at all costs and view them as self-imposed restraints or see them as achievements and congratulate ourselves?
The answer to this question will determine our aesthetic standpoint.
To be continued.
What one age considers a truism the next age dismisses as ridiculous absurdity. Reality is not as monolithic as is assumed. The possibility for great instability is there; this should not necessarily be employed, but at least acknowledged and pondered, if only occasionally. So it is with this in mind that I approach the topic at hand. Lampposts are ubiquitous; we pass a great number in the course of a single day without ever noting what they represent. They are so ingrained into our being that the possibility of their absence seems anathema, yet they are historically incidental. They are the ornaments of modernity, its symbol, and, as such, are indelibly woven into the construction of our values: They are ideological.
The Sun, and perhaps light in general, has a religious significance that lies, sometimes overtly, sometimes subconsciously, in the Western psyche. Pantheism and animalism gave pride of place to the Sun god, provider of life. Through the Egyptians and Greeks the religious world converged on monotheism, culminating in Christianity in whose the language of revelation and divinity is synonymous with light: Did not Moses demonstrate the Jewish god’s power by blacking out the Sun? Are we not supposed to ‘see the light?’ So the Enlightenment project in overthrowing the ‘superstitions’ of its backward forbears assumed this language. The power over light is power over Nature itself – a mighty goal for humanism. Lampposts are not just about illumination - they are about demonstration.
On every street in every town the power of scientific, rational thought is made evident to the populace. Man proves himself dominant over the revolutions of the Earth. Lampposts represent order and structure and serve society well. A government study (link listed below) has noted that it is not the amount of light that diminishes crime, nor are they of great assistance in increasing visibility, if anything they are blight, causing light pollution. Instead, the effects are placebonic in nature. Crime is reduced indirectly because the spirit of community is fostered, the perception of safety is increased. The rational justifications for their presence are not borne by the facts – they don’t directly reduced crime and one can question the utility of a little extra light. They provide comfort because they show that some higher power (the state) has control here and is looking after this area, giving it attention and this induces informal social control. Criminals are deterred not from fear of detection or improved surveillance but subconscious associations with the instruments of power. Lighted areas illustrate a more controlled use of public space, this is how they effect crime.
They are made by Man and yet seem somewhat natural. A street, particularly a high street, seems odd without this lighting. Since this is part of our identity should we praise their security and comfort or criticise the control they exercise, to pass judgement on this is to pass judgement on ourselves: Should we seek freedom at all costs and view them as self-imposed restraints or see them as achievements and congratulate ourselves?
The answer to this question will determine our aesthetic standpoint.
To be continued.
Squaring the Circle: History in the 21st Century
This contribution marks the first, I hope, of many.
This circle hopes to entertain thoughts on many subject, reflections on diverse topics, not in pursuit of some far-off and elusive idea of Truth. Instead, the modest and rewarding aim of attempting to make sense, as far as possible, of the world as it stands, both its proteanism and immutability, from the furthest distance to the most introverted of positions.
To this a glancing eye will be cast. Everthing shall be taken with the utmost seriousness, except perhaps ourselves (too much).
This circle hopes to entertain thoughts on many subject, reflections on diverse topics, not in pursuit of some far-off and elusive idea of Truth. Instead, the modest and rewarding aim of attempting to make sense, as far as possible, of the world as it stands, both its proteanism and immutability, from the furthest distance to the most introverted of positions.
To this a glancing eye will be cast. Everthing shall be taken with the utmost seriousness, except perhaps ourselves (too much).
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